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1. Introduction 
  
In early September 1998 a New York Times correspondent in Prishtina reported:  
As many as 40,000 ethnic Albanians, mostly women, children and old 
men, were trapped today on a dirt road south of here in western Kosovo as 
they tried to flee an advancing Serbian armored column, a United Nations 
official said.(1) 
These images, and the subsequent ones of tens of thousands of Kosovars literally 
camping under sheets of plastic or branches in the forests of Kosovo shook all observers. 
Then followed the images of massacred families, and an eyewitness account by a 
survivor of one of these massacres prompted the major powers to take some stronger 
political action.  
 The question immediately arose how the international community could provide 
protection and assistance to the people in the forests and elsewhere in Kosovo, as well as 
more fundamentally, where to find a political solution to the situation. As the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, pointed out in her speech to the 
Executive Committee of her Office (EXCOM) in early October 1998: 
Kosovo is a political problem with devastating humanitarian 
consequences. While colleagues in the field carry out their life-saving 
efforts, we must insist that a just and lasting political solution be realized 
immediately, before it is too late.(2)  
Once again Mrs. Ogata reiterated that humanitarian action can not be a substitute for 
political solution. Meanwhile, however, a full-scale humanitarian action had to be 
undertaken in the field. 
This paper focuses on the response by the international community to events during the 
summer and autumn of 1998, in particular on that of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its efforts to provide for protection and 
assistance to internally displaced persons in Kosovo. The main question raised is whether 
UNHCR is able to provide effective protection and assistance to internally displaced 
persons in an emergency situation, such as the one in Kosovo. Therefore the protection 
strategy developed by UNHCR, the obstacles in implementing the strategy concerned, as 
well as its success or failure will be analyzed. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the situation at the end of 1998, and in particular the challenges ahead for both UNHCR 
and the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This analysis uses information gathered by the author 
during a field visit to Kosovo and Belgrade between the end of September and early 
October 1998.  
  
2. Definition of internally displaced persons 
As a backdrop, it is desirable to examine briefly the definition of internally displaced 
persons, the legal framework involved, as well as the question of who is responsible for 
providing protection and assistance for the internally displaced. There is no firmly 
established definition of internally displaced persons, as the causes of displacement and 
the actual displacement situations are very diverse, such as mass violations of human 
rights, internal conflicts, break down of law and order, or natural disasters. In an effort to 
be as conclusive as possible, Francis M. Deng, Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General for internally displaced persons, defines them as: 
Persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of, or in order to 
avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who 
have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (Guiding 
Principles, Art. 2)(3) 
UNHCR, on the other hand defines internally displaced persons as  
…persons who, as a result of persecution, armed conflict or violence, have 
been forced to abandon their homes and leave their usual place of 
residence, and who remain within the borders of their own country,(4) 
thereby indicating that these persons, had they crossed an international border, would be 
refugees. This latter definition also provides a closer tie to UNHCR’s mandate, should 
the agency be or become involved in protecting and assisting internally displaced 
persons. There is no doubt that had the 300,000 internally displaced Kosovars crossed the 
international borders, they would have been considered refugees, like the more than 
30,000 who have sought refuge in the neighboring countries of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Macedonia and the tens of thousands of Kosovars in other countries, 
mainly Western Europe. 
  
3. Legal framework 
With regard to a legal framework, there is no specific system of international protection 
for internally displaced persons. These persons fall under the jurisdiction and sovereignty 
of the state within which they remain, complemented by general international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law, the latter in cases of an armed conflict, be 
it an international or internal one. It should be noted that internally displaced persons do 
not lose their inherent rights because of the displacement and should receive the same 
protection as those not displaced. However, the problem is that the actual or threatened 
displacement warrants specific responses to fulfilling basic human rights. One could 
argue that parts of refugee law could be applied by analogy, since in many cases the 
displaced are in a "refugee like situation" and would be refugees had they crossed a 
border.(5) Still, there are many gaps in the legal framework with regard to the protection 
of internally displaced persons. 
Very often internal displacement occurs in situations where the government either is 
unable or unwilling to provide protection and assistance, or, as in the case of Kosovo, 
government policy and actions in fact create displacement. Therefore, one of the tasks of 
the Representative, Mr. Francis Deng, has been to study the legal framework related to 
the protection of internally displaced persons and to prepare a set of guiding 
principles.(6) Mr. Deng concluded in his report that some basic rights, such as the right to 
life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, etc., are 
adequately protected by international law. If they are not respected, the reason is the 
unwillingness of the state to fulfil its obligations, rather than an inadequate legal 
framework. On the other hand, in many instances further clarifications of international 
law would be needed for specific rights, so that such law would be applicable in a 
situation of internal displacement.(7)  
The guiding principles presented in 1998 to the UN Commission on Human Rights are 
intended to identify the rights and guarantees for the protection of internally displaced 
persons and to fill the legal gaps affecting the specific problems faced by these 
persons.(8) The principles reiterate the rights of internally displaced persons and the 
obligations of states as well as of other parties to the conflict, thus offering, among other 
things, protection against arbitrary displacement, protection during the actual 
displacement, and reintegration after displacement. Notably, the principles also spell out 
the right of internally displaced persons to request international humanitarian assistance, 
the right of the international community to provide for humanitarian assistance, and the 
duty of the state to accept such assistance. Although the guiding principles are not a 
legally binding document, the principles reflect existing international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law.(9) For UNHCR, the guidelines provide for a 
"valuable protection tool and a strongly persuasive frame of reference."(10) 
With respect to this case study of Kosovo it should be noted that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) has ratified the basic human rights documents(11) as well as those 
related to international humanitarian law.(12) The latter includes the second Protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions, which relates to non-international conflicts. Specific reference 
is made to the latter, since there is no doubt that this document would be applicable to the 
situation in Kosovo, where hostilities are between the national armed forces and armed 
groups organized under the leadership of a responsible command and exercising such 
control over a part of the territory as to enable them to conduct sustained and concerted 
military operations. It should be noted that the insurgent forces do not need to be 
signatories to this second protocol to be bound by it. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav 
authorities have repeatedly denied that there is or has been an internal conflict, thus 
refusing to admit that the above documents are applicable. Likewise, the authorities have 
been refusing visas to investigators of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).(13) However, Yugoslavia has not signed the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction of 1997, and has planted mines in Kosovo, in particular in the border 
areas towards Albania. 
Given the above, along with national legislation, the main legal framework is there to 
protect internally displaced persons in Kosovo. However, as is known from a vast variety 
of reports, the Serb authorities have violated numerous articles in the international 
conventions mentioned, as indeed have the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other 
armed factions.(14)  
  
4. Who is responsible for providing international protection for internally displaced 
persons? 
The question then to be raised is, when the government is either unwilling or unable to 
carry out its responsibilities for protection of internally displaced persons, who is 
responsible? Today, we are in a situation where there is no single international 
organization clearly responsible for internally displaced persons. Instead, what has 
emerged is a set of concrete situations in which various organizations have taken the lead 
or responsibility for the protection of and assistance to the internally displaced.(15) 
In an armed conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is clearly 
mandated to protect and assist internally displaced persons. Indeed in many conflict 
situations the ICRC does play an important role. The ICRC has in fact been present in 
Kosovo since 1993 and has been involved in a whole range of protection activities. At the 
height of the emergency in Kosovo during the summer and autumn of 1998, the ICRC 
reached out to those in the forests with emergency relief, and was still at the end of 1998 
attempting to gain access to persons arrested by both sides, establishing the whereabouts 
of those abducted, as well as ensuring that the wounded and sick received adequate 
treatment. The ICRC is increasingly involved in advocacy, using media to raise 
awareness of serious abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.  
In both armed conflict and post-conflict situations, UNHCR has taken responsibility for 
internally displaced persons. In fact UNHCR has been considered by some as best suited 
to have overall responsibility for internally displaced persons in view of its expertise, but 
so far the organization has been unwilling to accept such responsibility.(16) Nonetheless, 
UNHCR still takes over the responsibility on an ad hoc basis, when it is requested to do 
so by the Secretary General or the General Assembly. In fact UNHCR’s Statute of 1950 
allows additional activities as determined by the General Assembly.(17) The General 
Assembly has since then given over this task to the Secretary General.(18) 
There are in essence four situations when UNHCR has taken, or might take, the lead and 
responsibility for internally displaced persons:(19) 
1. Internally displaced persons live alongside a refugee population and have similar 
needs for protection and assistance; 
2. Internally displaced persons are already present in or going back to the same area 
as returning refugees; 
3. The same situation has caused both refugees and internally displaced persons, and 
it make sense to cater for the needs of both in one single operation; and 
4. There is a potential for cross border movement, and therefore protection and 
assistance in the country of origin would enable the internally displaced to remain 
in their country of origin. 
In the above situations it would not only make sense for UNHCR to cater to the needs of 
both the internally displaced and refugees alike, but it would be undesirable, maybe even 
detrimental, for UNHCR and/or its beneficiaries, not to treat them on an equal basis.(20) 
In some cases even remainees, that is, persons who have stayed behind when the majority 
have fled, are also included in the assistance programs. One could therefore argue that 
UNHCR should not categorize its beneficiaries, but be involved in a situation where it 
has an important role to play. Also the High Commissioner has stressed the importance of 
a comprehensive approach to the different categories of displaced persons.(21) 
However, in order not to compromise its original mandate, UNHCR has established a 
number of more specific criteria which have to be met in order for the agency to take the 
responsibility for internally displaced persons:(22) 
1. There should be a specific request made by the Secretary General or General 
Assembly to UNHCR; 
2. The state concerned and other relevant parties should give their consent to 
UNHCR’s involvement; 
3. Resources such as funds and human capacity must be available; 
4. The activities should be compatible with regular protection functions so that 
UNHCR’s expertise and experience, especially in protection, is relevant in the 
particular situation; 
5. These activities should not undermine the right of internally displaced persons to 
seek asylum in another state, since UNHCR’s primary obligation is to safeguard 
the institution of asylum; 
6. UNHCR must have unhindered and secured access to the internally displaced 
persons. 
In this case study of Kosovo, UNHCR has been explicitly referred to as the lead 
humanitarian agency in Kosovo. This role derives naturally from the agency’s mandate to 
protect and assist refugees from and internally displaced persons in Former Yugoslavia, 
which indeed is based on a request by the Secretary General and was later on confirmed 
in the Annex 7 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (GFAP), the so called Dayton Peace Accord; UNHCR’s lead role has 
subsequently been reinforced in reports from the Secretary General on the situation in 
Kosovo.(23) 
At times the question is posed whether UNHCR can claim to have been accorded the 
mandate to protect internally displaced persons by virtue of its lead roles in coordinating 
the humanitarian response in complex emergencies involving internally displaced. The 
High Commissioner, Mrs. Ogata, has stated that "humanitarian responses should serve 
first of all the protection of people,"(24) thus "ensuring the basic human rights, security 
and protection of all victims on all sides of a conflict."(25) Often the humanitarian 
response is seen strictly as delivering assistance, forms of food, non-food items, 
medicines, shelter, material and so forth in order to avoid the dilemma of national 
sovereignty. In fact, however, to be effective and successful, the humanitarian response 
has to be holistic. Therefore it should also include measures to ensure physical safety and 
respect for human rights, including advising the government on drafting laws to protect 
specific rights of internally displaced persons, intervening to register the internally 
displaced, thereby entitling them to assistance, access to health care and education, as 
well as establishing monitoring mechanisms and making sure their rights are fully 
respected.(26) All of the above activities are examples of traditional UNHCR core 
protection functions. Moreover, UNHCR’s primary mandate is to protect and seek 
durable solutions, and therefore it goes without saying that those objectives must always 
be there for all activities undertaken by the organization. Interestingly enough, many 
development and humanitarian organizations have interpreted protection to mean 
delivering assistance and are only now coming around to add physical security and 
human rights issues to this term.(27) There is in fact a clear interdependence between 
protection and assistance. Assistance is frequently seen as a tool of protection, since it is 
much more than just providing for essential means. Assistance also provides access to 
those in need, and once access has been achieved, the presence of international 
organizations may possibly (temporarily at least) deter human rights abuses and 
displacement.(28) Assistance is also protection in the sense that it promotes basic human 
rights, such as rights to food, health and shelter. Therefore, UNHCR’s mandate for 
internally displaced persons has to be seen as a mandate to protect and assist, and to truly 
fulfil its mandate the agency should not compromise its protection function.(29) 
The Yugoslav government has agreed to UNHCR’s role in Kosovo, and in fact increased 
its cooperation after the Milosevic-Yeltsin meeting in June 1998, as part of the agreement 
to avoid sanctions. At top levels of the Yugoslav government, it was agreed that UNHCR 
should have unhindered access to the internally displaced, although that instruction has 
not always filtered down to the local police at checkpoints. Nor do the local authorities 
always seem clear about the mandate of UNHCR. Therefore sensitization is important. In 
interviews with UNHCR officials in Belgrade and Kosovo, this author was told that in 
fact the government would like UNHCR to provide a good picture of the situation. 
UNHCR’s role for the 700,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia who 
arrived in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 1991-95, which includes having 
brought in significant funding, is highly appreciated by the government. This gives added 
respect for the opinion and activities of UNHCR, and allows the organization to get 
involved in activities other than those strictly benefiting refugees without compromising 
its original mandate. However, the main concern of the authorities was that UNHCR not 
overstep its mandate, which is humanitarian, not political.(30) 
The degree of consent between UNHCR and government officials clearly relates closely 
to the sixth condition for UNHCR’s acceptance of responsibility for internally displaced 
persons, namely that of unhindered access. Any problem at the field level is immediately 
brought to the attention of the top level in Belgrade. During her visit between late 
September and early October 1998, this author observed that UNHCR vehicles were 
stopped at many police checkpoints. Their occupants were asked where they were 
heading and, although reference was made to the agreement with higher police authorities 
for unhindered access everywhere in Kosovo, the local police officer in charge had to 
check with his police commander. The UNHCR officials were then be able to pass, but 
"at their own risk, due to the possibility of terrorists in the area."  
The operation in former Yugoslavia, along with other UNHCR operations, has received 
less and less funding as a result of donor fatigue. As a result of funds having to be spread 
to include the emergency activities in Kosovo, the regular refugee program in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia suffered. A special Inter-Agency Appeal for Kosovo was 
launched in August 1998. This did elicit the necessary response thanks to the media 
attention given to the conflict in Kosovo during the late summer and early fall 1998, 
when the Serb offensive closed in on the KLA and drove tens of thousands of Kosovars 
out in the open, with no escape from the approaching winter. This appeal was made to 
cover the much needed activities in Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (for 
Kosovo and Montenegro) and Macedonia for the period of June to December 1998. The 
total of the appeal reached 54 million US dollars, with UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF 
appealing for the largest amounts.(31) With the high donor response, both food and non-
food items were being delivered or were in the pipeline of many organizations by late 
September 1998. Moreover, UNHCR started to increase its international staff in Kosovo 
and Montenegro in August 1998, something that already had been done in Albania along 
with the first arrivals of refugees in March 1998. So the condition of available resources, 
in terms of both funds and human resources, was improving in late September and early 
October 1998. However, the pledges did not suffice for a carry over into 1999. 
Accordingly, a new appeal was launched in December 1998.(32) There was, however, 
concern among international monitors that the donations would be a cover for the lack of 
political engagement.  
UNHCR’s activities on behalf of internally displaced persons in Kosovo are compatible 
with its refugee programs there; indeed UNHCR has had a field office in Kosovo since 
late 1992. Until the increased fighting in spring and summer 1998, the main concern of 
the UNHCR office in Prishtina was the refugees, mainly Serb refugees from Croatia, 
staying in collective centers in the Kosovo province. UNHCR had already acquired 
relevant skills and an operational capacity, using the established networks for protection 
and assistance. This capacity could easily be expanded to benefit also the internally 
displaced persons. Furthermore, it was expected that both refugees from neighboring 
countries and internally displaced Kosovars in Montenegro and Kosovo would be 
returning to their places of origin or to temporary accommodation nearby. In such 
circumstances, UNHCR cannot and should not differentiate between returning refugees 
and internally displaced persons. 
Western European countries were not the only ones worried about an influx of Kosovars; 
so too were the neighboring countries in Central Europe.(33) Serb forces had quickly cut 
off and mined the border area with Albania and efficiently closed the border. The reason 
for doing so was less to prevent Kosovars from fleeing to Albania, than to prevent the 
KLA from receiving its supply of arms and ammunition, as well as fighters, through the 
Albanian border. Macedonia, with a sizable Albanian minority of around 30 percent and 
worried about being dragged into this conflict or an influx of Kosovo asylum seekers 
having a destabilizing effect on its own internal affairs, also closed its border. 
Montenegro, having been severely affected by the number of refugees from the 1991-95 
conflicts and then receiving an additional 42,000 Kosovars, a total number equal to 12 
percent of the entire population of Montenegro, did the same. However, in October 1998, 
the Montenegrin authorities assured UNHCR that Kosovars could be allowed entry on a 
case by case basis. 
Emphasis had to be put on the condition that protection and assistance of internally 
displaced persons should not diminish the possibility to seek asylum abroad. This was 
made clear in numerous statements made by the High Commissioner herself and her staff. 
In her opening statement at the October 1998 meeting of the UNHCR Executive 
Committee (EXCOM), on conditions for UNHCR’s continued intervention on behalf of 
internally displaced persons the High Commissioner stated that UNHCR would so 
intervene 
when requested and authorized to do so, and in particular where their 
situation may cause refugee flows…provided that the right of all people to 
seek asylum is respected, and provided that through our work we can 
facilitate the search for solutions for all those forcibly displaced.(34)  
  
5. UNHCR’s protection strategy in Kosovo 
Having established its role to protect and assist internally displaced persons in Kosovo, 
what then could UNHCR do to protect the internally displaced in Kosovo during the 
height of hostilities during the summer and early fall of 1998, and what are the 
implications for UNHCR’s role in the future? Clearly the task was daunting. The local 
authorities did not always let UNHCR or its implementing partners through checkpoints. 
In some cases the authorities confiscated humanitarian goods and took staff of 
humanitarian agencies hostages. Three Mother Teresa Society relief workers were killed 
under fire in August 1998.(35) The hostilities, in the form of shootings, shelling, and land 
mines, constituted security threats to humanitarian agencies, UNHCR included. 
Moreover, the internally displaced persons who had fled into the forest in the hills had 
often to move for security reasons when the fighting around them came closer. Therefore, 
it was not only difficult to trace them, but once found, they often had to move again, just 
when the convoy with humanitarian assistance was scheduled to arrive. 
The strategy launched was simple and based on the importance of field presence.(36) 
Presence and close monitoring meant that UNHCR would have first-hand knowledge of 
the needs for protection and assistance, which was essential for coordinating the 
humanitarian response, as mandated by the Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan. Through 
close information sharing, the mandates of the various organizations involved were 
respected. ICRC, for example, was clearly mandated to address detention issues, among 
others, and UNHCHR and other human rights organizations were mandated to address 
issues of fair trial and human rights abuses. This coordination was important not only in 
order to avoid overlapping, but also to provide expertise for solving the problems at hand 
and, equally important, to maintaining credibility with the government authorities. To 
facilitate the information sharing and coordination, UNHCR set up an operations room in 
its office in Prishtina, where the latest information on the whereabouts of internally 
displaced persons, the security situation (on-going fighting, minefields), convoys, field 
visits and so forth were monitored.  
Presence also meant that UNHCR staff could witness events, monitor the human rights 
situation, intervene when appropriate, or alert those who could intervene, all within its 
mandate as the lead agency for the humanitarian response. Being in the field, being 
eyewitness to events and consequences of events, UNHCR was able to report with 
credibility the atrocities as well as developments on the ground. The advocacy role was 
emphasized. With international staff in Prishtina, including a Public Information Officer 
who frequently made field trips and interviewed internally displaced persons, UNHCR 
could report what the organization itself had witnessed. These reports were then 
distributed through media contacts and the diplomatic community. The High 
Commissioner, Mrs. Ogata, as well as her Special Envoy, Mr. Nicholas Morris, addressed 
the Security Council on several occasions with regard to the situation in Kosovo.(37) 
It was important that the international community be united in its reporting. This meant 
close information sharing among all organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental. The reporting could be devastating for the authorities, and this, it was 
hoped, would make the authorities refrain from committing atrocities. Since the reporting 
was united, the authorities would be unlikely to expel all expatriates. UNHCR decided 
early on to be as vocal as possible, without compromising itself. 
Through its presence and reporting, UNHCR and other organizations hoped to be able, at 
least to some extent, to stabilize the tense situation and provide protection from abuses 
for which the authorities would not like to have eyewitnesses. Alternatively, the 
authorities would think twice before directly harming foreign citizens. In other words, the 
expatriates would provide a human shield. 
Presence, combined with interventions, provided for mitigation of human rights abuses, 
but at the same time it was important to make sure that the internally displaced persons, 
and the few remainees and returnees, understood that the international organizations 
could not guarantee their security. Often, groups of internally displaced persons 
approached UNHCR with a request to facilitate their return home, and UNHCR was then 
confronted with a dilemma. Even if the local Police Chief promised to guarantee security, 
there were no firm guarantees that the Albanians would be safe from abuse or attacks by 
others. On the other hand, the winter was approaching and the internally displaced 
persons would not survive in the forest. There were no accommodation facilities in the 
towns to which UNHCR could refer them, due to the large numbers of displaced persons 
in need of shelter. By themselves, the internally displaced persons would have difficulties 
passing through checkpoints or the forest to the nearby towns, which in general were not 
attacked by the Serbian forces. So the choices were that UNHCR would advise the 
internally displaced to stay in the hills, where they would suffer exposure to both winter 
conditions and fighting or UNHCR would facilitate their potentially risky return to their 
villages. UNHCR at times decided to make visits to assess the levels of damage in the 
villages and arrange for meetings between the village leaders and police authorities. In 
the latter meetings UNHCR was only an observer, taking no active role in the 
discussions. If an agreement were reached among the police, authorities, and the 
villagers, UNHCR would assist with the return movement. Even in such cases, however, 
UNHCR was careful to say that it was not advising anyone to return to the home villages, 
nor would UNHCR be able to monitor the situation in the return village on a frequent 
basis, but if the villagers insisted, UNHCR would assist. Indeed, this was a very delicate 
decision to take.  
In summary, presence could allow for enhancing the advocacy role of the international 
agencies through monitoring and reporting, enhancing needs assessment and 
interventions, as well as by providing "human shields."(38) However, during the spring, 
summer and early fall of 1998 there were many obstacles to establishing the kind of 
effective presence that could lead to providing protection and assistance in Kosovo. Each 
of the obstacles had to be overcome in turn. 
The fighting seriously hampered UNHCR’s access to internally displaced persons. The 
authorities effectively sealed off villages during the actual attack by the Serb armed or 
special police forces, and UNHCR was not allowed to pass checkpoints surrounding the 
village under attack. Despite frequent field monitoring in villages all around Kosovo 
province, UNHCR did not have the resources to have permanent presence in the villages. 
The agency instead established small field offices in three major cities, Mitrovica, Pec 
and Prizren, in addition to the main office for the province in Prishtina. Being denied 
access to areas where fighting took place, UNHCR could not by its presence be a human 
shield or be an eyewitness to serious abuse, nor reach the internally displaced persons 
with necessary humanitarian aid. Moreover, it was difficult to predict where the attacks 
would take place and get there beforehand, and due to the precarious security situation, 
UNHCR had a self-imposed curfew allowing field trips to villages only during the day. 
However, as soon as the attack was over, UNHCR could access the area and search for 
the villagers, who often had taken shelter in the nearby forest. In addition to the risk of 
being caught in a crossfire or under attack, there were also mines. The first mine 
accidents involving international monitors and aid workers took place in August and 
September 1998. As a result, movements were further restricted in more mine-prone 
areas, making access to the internally displaced, particularly those in the open, more 
difficult. The same day the author arrived in Kosovo, at the end of September, the ICRC 
team drove on a mine, leaving one Albanian doctor dead and three other passengers 
seriously injured. The precarious security situation can be considered as the main 
obstacle impeding UNHCR, humanitarian organizations, and international monitors from 
providing protection and assistance, and could only be overcome once there was a cease 
fire agreement. 
As a result of the fighting, the situation changed rapidly on the ground, requiring constant 
reassessment of the necessary responses and new strategies. New flows of internally 
displaced persons had to be located and given assistance. Often the internally displaced 
moved overnight in response to the fighting, thus making it difficult to find them. Convoy 
routes were constantly revised as new and more pressing needs elsewhere were 
identified. Networks got disrupted and then regained their links and strength over and 
over again. Close coordination and information sharing among all organizations was 
required to have up-to-date information on the actual situation on the ground, as well as 
the capacity to analyze the situation, take immediate and sound decisions, and react on 
short notice. 
Initially there was a lack of available financial, material, and human resources. However, 
the response to the Inter-Agency Appeal and other donor responses brought additional 
funds for both relief items and the logistical support needed. The existence of warehouse 
facilities and trucks in each of the four towns with UNHCR offices, as points of departure 
for convoys, made it possible to increase the delivery points and therefore reach more 
beneficiaries, as well as to reroute convoys on short notice to those in particularly dire 
need. Relief goods were also brought in from Belgrade directly to warehouses of the 
Mother Theresa Society and government distribution points, which were established in 
smaller towns. "Flooding the area with international eyewitnesses" requires a large 
number of persons. Moreover, the police, the military or the KLA harassed humanitarian 
agency national staff. It was therefore essential to provide expatriates as convoy leaders 
to protect the local drivers. By early fall, however, more expatriates and more 
organizations had begun to arrive, but, unfortunately, with an emphasis on assistance 
rather than protection. 
Coordination is key when the actors are many, and more new organizations were coming 
in. By mid-September there was closer coordination, including regular inter-agency 
meetings on both sectoral and cross-sectoral bases. As many organizations needed 
support from UNHCR, the agency could influence project deliveries in particular if they 
were linked to funding from UNHCR. The coordination was crucial in order to fill the 
gaps and avoid duplication both in terms of regional areas and sectors to be covered. 
Through this reinforced coordination, combined with more organizational capacity in 
term of both human and other resources and the firmer role UNHCR could play, the most 
capable organization could be chosen to take responsibility for the various sectors 
concerned. 
Despite the additional resources, both material and human, the problem of access 
remained, not only because of the fighting but also since UNHCR was not in a position to 
enforce its access to those in need, or to ensure respect for interventions on behalf of the 
persons concerned. The lack of enforcement is a highly political issue, and therefore 
outside UNHCR’s mandate. Indirectly, UNHCR can—through its reporting—influence 
those mandated to enforce compliance with the Security Council Resolutions, according 
to which international humanitarian organizations are to be given free and unimpeded 
access.(39) Ultimately however, the decision to enforce compliance depends on the 
political will of the Security Council and NATO member states.(40) 
The main obstacle to providing protection to the internally displaced was then, and still 
was at the end of 1998, the lack of political will to find a political solution. Overcoming 
some of the most severe problems, such as the fighting and security concerns, was 
entirely dependent on a political solution. A cease-fire is a temporary solution, and only a 
political solution provides for a durable solution to the plight of the internally displaced.  
Fortunately, there were also factors that facilitated UNHCR’s efforts to coordinate the 
humanitarian response. First, UNHCR had been closely following the events since the 
opening of its office in Kosovo in late 1992, and therefore had established contacts with 
the Serb authorities as well as with the Albanian community. Second, there was already 
an established network of both local and international organizations, so the new 
organizations entering the scene could tap into existing structures. This was possible 
since the increased funding was also used to increase the capacity of these existing 
structures and networks so they could cope with the new demands. 
  
6. How successful was UNHCR in its efforts to protect internally displaced? 
All things considered, how effective was the protection and assistance provided? The first 
question is how to measure the success of protection in terms of preventing displacement 
and facilitating return, the ultimate goal of the activities on behalf of internally displaced 
persons. Should an operation be evaluated by comparing it with a best case scenario or a 
worst case scenario? Or should one simply assess it against more realistic goals for the 
operation, that is, to be present on the ground, reporting, intervening, delivering 
assistance, but not against such goals as providing security guarantees, which only a 
government or parties to a conflict can do? This author believes that the latter should be 
subject to evaluation. 
There are always high expectations of, as well as considerable skepticism about, what 
UNHCR can in fact do for internally displaced persons in a conflict situation. 
Notwithstanding its ability to provide humanitarian assistance, UNHCR has not in the 
past been able to demonstrate that it could prevent displacement in critical moments.(41) 
Some argue that attempts to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced 
persons have been detrimental to the ultimate aim of protection, by giving neighboring 
countries a pretext to close their borders to asylum seekers, and thereby forcing internally 
displaced persons to remain internally displaced.(42) Even UNHCR itself acknowledges 
that, traditionally, it has played a limited role in the protection of human rights and 
physical security, and that, in fact, most of the displaced rely on their own survival skills, 
rather than on foreign protection and assistance.(43) This self-criticism is soundly based 
in the fact that humanitarian action, including attempts to provide protection, cannot 
solve the political problems inherent in most conflict situations. 
Facts have been reported and the High Commissioner and her Special Envoy have briefed 
the Security Council and key governments in other international fora. UNHCR has held 
regular meetings with media and the diplomatic community in Geneva. The reporting 
verified the extent of the problem in Kosovo portrayed by the media and human rights 
organizations, and the combined efforts of all involved resulted in an international effort 
to put in place a cease-fire during which a political solution could be sought. On the 
ground, the Serbian government was very worried about the reporting done by the 
UNHCR as well as by other international organizations and the media.(44) This could be 
an indication that the Serbian authorities did take into consideration the international 
presence in the conflict area.(45) Therefore, it could be argued that UNHCR, together 
with the other actors, might to some degree have prevented further displacement and 
grave abuses of human rights; that is, the situation could have been even worse. 
Over time during the late summer and early autumn of 1998, there were improvements in 
the provision of protection and assistance, as more international staff and more resources, 
combined with better coordination, enhanced the quantity and quality of the response and 
increased the ability to reach those in need. The additional UNHCR staff as well as the 
three new offices in major towns were crucial, but could have been in place earlier on. 
This was important since enhancing access to those in need (the humanitarian response) 
can serve as protection, even in the sense of providing limited physical and legal 
protection. Kosovo is a good example of how international presence provides for an 
enhanced feeling of security. The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) noted 
after the cease-fire and subsequent troop withdrawals (as per the so called Holbrooke-
Milosevic agreement) in late October 1998, that returns to villages they frequently 
patrolled reached 70 to 100 percent of the displaced population.(46) On the other hand, 
the places chosen to be patrolled were those to which returns were taking place. During 
her visit to Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, the author met a group of former internally 
displaced persons who had returned in July 1998 with UNHCR assistance, on the strength 
of a guarantee from the local police chief. In September 1998, this group of returnees was 
spared further harassment when their village was used as base for a Serb military assault 
on three neighboring villages. Some of the other villagers fled again. A few weeks later, 
very soon after the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, 60 percent of the original village 
population had either remained or returned.  
Still, mere presence is no guarantee of security and protection. Many international staff of 
the organizations present were worried that their presence would invoke a false 
atmosphere of security. Others argued that the Kosovars, especially those in hiding in the 
forests and hills, had no illusions about the degree of protection that international 
presence could provide. It is clear that unarmed UNHCR officials cannot prevent 
massacres or killings, when indeed that is the main aim of the government. At the height 
of the conflict, the international community was barred from entering areas of actual 
fighting, and therefore was not able to provide a "human shield" for the internally 
displaced. The organizations could only watch the shelling of villages from a distance. 
Moreover, knowing that a military solution was sought, UNHCR could not put its staff at 
risk.  
  
7. The situation at the end of 1998 
In early September 1998, UNHCR estimated that approximately 50,000 persons were 
living outdoors. By mid November 1998 there were no internally displaced persons out in 
the forest, freezing in the open.(47) This development, however, cannot be attributed to 
UNHCR, but to the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Mr. Holbrooke, which resulted in a 
commitment by President Milosevic on 13 October 1998 to comply with Security 
Council Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998. This resolution called for a cease-fire, 
withdrawal of police and military forces, return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons to their homes, and unhindered access for the humanitarian organizations and 
supplies, among other conditions. Once the police and military pulled out from an area, 
the returns to that particular area started. 
Although no internally displaced persons remained out in the open at the end of 1998, 
few were able to return to their homes. UNHCR estimated that 175,000 were still 
displaced, staying with family, relatives or friends in villages and towns other than their 
own. The main obstacle to return was the security situation, according to those still 
displaced at the end of 1998. Many, especially those coming from areas where there was 
Serb police presence, remained worried for their safety. The cease-fire was indeed 
fragile, and there were numerous instances of attacks between the Serb police and KLA 
or other Albanian militia groups. The most serious threat against the cease-fire took place 
in mid-December, when Serb border guards killed 31 and captured nine ethnic Albanians 
crossing over the border from Albania, just one day after six Serb youths had been killed 
in a cafe in the southern part of Kosovo.(48) Several returnees were killed by booby-traps 
and landmines that were found in homes, yards, schools, and elsewhere.(49) In some 
cases, internally displaced persons tended their fields and repaired their homes during 
daytime, but withdrew to safer areas for the night. Indeed there were reports of police 
harassment, such as spot checks, in which buses were stopped, luggage checked, and men 
separated from women and children, interrogated, beaten up and detained.(50) In one 
case a whole village of 2,400 people was held hostage without food for 24 hours while 
the Serb forces searched the houses for weapons.(51) Although UNHCR normally is not 
following up on general human rights issues, such as arbitrary harassment and detention 
by the police, in cases where internally displaced persons and refugees are targeted for 
such actions, it is of UNHCR’s concern as well. 
These events not only highlight the need for continued monitoring, reporting and 
advocacy, but also the need for an amnesty law as the first step towards an atmosphere of 
confidence, viable cease-fire, and return. In accordance with the Holbrooke-Milosevic 
agreement, the Government immediately announced that no combatant who had laid 
down his weapons would be prosecuted. However, the Serbian Minister of Interior stated 
somewhat later that an actual amnesty law could be discussed only once a political 
settlement had been reached, a census and elections held, and new organs of local 
government formed.(52) Indeed many ethnic Albanian men had been arrested, charged 
with "terrorist acts," and convicted after the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement.(53) In line 
with its protection functions on behalf of refugees, returnees, and internally displaced 
persons, UNHCR is pressing the government for an amnesty law.  
Because of the fragile situation at the end of 1998, UNHCR did not promote repatriation 
from neighboring countries and republics, although the agency was prepared to facilitate 
the return of those who voluntarily approached UNHCR for such assistance. In particular, 
lawlessness and banditry in northern parts of Albania made some refugees decide to 
return to Kosovo, rather than be relocated elsewhere in Albania. The latter was an option 
UNHCR was pursuing with the Albanian authorities by identifying and rehabilitating 
possible temporary accommodation in safer areas inside Albania, where the refugees 
could receive the necessary assistance. UNHCR also pleaded that Western Countries not 
send back rejected asylum seekers, a plea to which at least some countries indicated they 
would adhere.(54)  
The armed conflict has had disastrous consequences in the villages. By late November 
1998, UNHCR estimated that 75,000 persons had returned to their villages, but few were 
living in their own houses. At that time UNHCR also assessed the destruction in 240 out 
of the 350 villages in Kosovo. Only around 90 of these 240 were unaffected by the 
fighting, while the remaining 150 were damaged to various degrees. On average, the 
houses in one third of these villages were totally destroyed, nearly another third were 
heavily damaged and in need of major repairs, and only 40 percent were intact or 
habitable with small repairs needed. UNHCR distributed emergency shelter repair kits, 
which included plastic sheeting, nails, and other materials with the idea of enabling the 
returnees to repair at least one habitable room. UNHCR has also coordinated with the 
Yugoslavian government, which is obliged under Security Council Resolution 1199 to 
provide for building material, such as tiles, windows, bricks. Some of these had been 
delivered by the end of 1998. 
Entire components of the physical and social infrastructure of Kosovo collapsed during 
the conflict in the province: electricity was cut off, schools destroyed, the parallel health 
system of local medical clinics interrupted. In fact, even before the armed conflict 
erupted, the general health situation was very precarious, and tens of thousands of 
children had never been immunized. The collapse of the infrastructure has been 
considered the second main obstacle to return, according to the displaced Kosovars. 
UNICEF, together with a number of NGOs, has implemented projects to improve the 
health situation, rebuild schools and provide for school materials, among other projects. 
Reconciliation measures have been incorporated in some of these projects. The toll on 
agriculture was also considerable: livestock have been killed, farming equipment 
destroyed, landmines found on farmland. The displaced returned too late for the planting 
season, and in many cases the security situation or displacement did not allow harvesting 
during the summer and fall. Therefore seeds for the spring planting had to be provided by 
international organizations. 
All things considered, the needs for both food and non-food assistance were enormous. 
During the last week of November 1998, UNHCR was able to coordinate 120 trucks to 
100,000 beneficiaries (internally displaced persons, returnees and host families) in 21 
locations. It is also essential to remember that the internally displaced persons, returnees, 
and remainees need support to cope with their experience of displacement, including 
adjusting to new roles within the family and community.(55) In this regard UNHCR was 
coordinating projects and networks to reach the most vulnerable, emphasizing the 
existing local networks, which include a taskforce comprising the Serbian public health 
sector, the Albanian health sector, and NGOs. However, many Kosovo Albanians, and 
particularly children, were without identity documents because of their reluctance to 
register with Serb authorities. The lack of identity documents can pose difficulties in 
registering for assistance (especially assistance or services through government 
structures) as well as in returning to Kosovo from Montenegro or neighboring countries. 
This is yet another issue that has to be solved with the Yugoslav authorities, as they are 
still—at least formally—in charge. 
  
8. The roles of ICRC, UNHCHR, and ICTY 
As earlier noted, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) played an 
important role during the actual conflict as well as after the cease-fire.(56) The needs for 
humanitarian assistance, tracing of abducted persons, access to and negotiations for 
release of hostages and prisoners of war, and so forth, still prevail. The UN Security 
Council’s Resolution 1199 highlights the role of ICRC, in particular with regard to return 
of displaced persons and refugees as well as access for the organization to deliver 
humanitarian supplies.  
By late 1998, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) had 
finally signed a memorandum of understanding with the Yugoslav government and was 
expected to establish an office in Prishtina from which to monitor human rights abuses, 
and undertake appropriate interventions. The UNHCHR’s main focus was to be on 
monitoring, training of international monitors as well as of local and national authorities, 
(notably the police, judiciary and administration) and capacity building of local and 
national human rights institutions.(57) Among other priorities, there was seen to be an 
urgent need to establish an Ombudsman institution. To fulfill these needs, however, the 
UNHCHR would desperately need more resources; as of late 1998, they were still 
awaiting more staff and equipment, and they still had only one vehicle for their activities 
covering the entire country. 
Other organizations remained similarly constrained: The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was still awaiting visas for their investigators, despite the 
obligation of the Yugoslav government to cooperate with the Tribunal in accordance with 
Security Council Resolutions. Despite the fact that the Statute of the Tribunal clearly 
states its competence to cover crimes against humanity that have taken place in the entire 
Former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government disputed the mandate of ICTY in Kosovo. 
It would be of utmost importance for an atmosphere of trust and reconciliation that those 
who have committed atrocities and crimes against humanity be investigated, charged, and 
punished as appropriate. 
  
9. The role of OSCE 
The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, which was announced 13 October 1998, added new 
elements for the protection of the internally displaced persons, a number of which involve 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).(58)  
1. OSCE was to provide ground verification, with a force of 2,000 to verify the 
compliance of all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 of 
23 September 1998. In addition, OSCE was to supervise elections in Kosovo and 
to maintain a close liaison with the authorities of all parties and accredited 
organizations; 
2. NATO was to provide aerial verification of the government’s compliance with 
the above Security Council Resolution 1199; and 
3. President Milosevic agreed upon a political framework, within which a political 
settlement would be reached with the Kosovo Albanians. This settlement would 
include a broad self-government in Kosovo, elections to a Kosovo Assembly and 
an amnesty provision. 
OSCE had to leave the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1993 when its mandate for 
monitoring the situation in Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina was not extended by the 
Yugoslav government as a result of the suspension of the membership of the latter in 
OSCE. During the entire spring and summer of 1998, as the situation in Kosovo 
worsened, the OSCE had tried to negotiate a new return to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, but until October 1998, all negotiations were in vain.(59) With the 
Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement in place, OSCE was quick to react and agree to its new 
task.(60) 
The agreement between OSCE and the Yugoslav government was signed on 16 October 
1998 for a one year period and relates to political and human rights issues as well as to 
humanitarian issues.(61) With regard to the political or human rights issues, it was agreed 
that the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would be able to travel throughout 
Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements and to investigate 
reports of cease-fire violations. It was also agreed that the KVM would be able to 
accompany police units as well as border control units in Kosovo as they perform their 
normal roles. More significantly, the Mission Director would, once the political 
settlement defining Kosovo’s self-government had been achieved and implementation 
was to begin, assist in areas such as election supervision in order to ensure fairness and 
openness of the elections, and the establishment of Kosovo institutions and police force 
development. KVM would also receive periodic updates from the relevant authorities 
concerning eventual allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel as well 
as updates on the status of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in 
such abuses. 
With regard to OSCE’s role in humanitarian issues, it was agreed that the KVM would, 
…to the extent possible, assist UNHCR, ICRC and other international 
organizations in facilitating the return of displaced persons to their homes, 
the provision of facilitative and humanitarian assistance to them by the 
FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities as well as the humanitarian 
organizations and NGOs.(62)  
KVM would also verify the level of co-operation and support provided by the Yugoslav 
government and its entities to the humanitarian organizations and accredited NGOs. The 
Yugoslav government agreed to give these organizations support in facilitating 
procedural requirements such as issuance of travel documentation, expedited customs 
clearance for humanitarian shipments and radio frequencies. Whenever it deemed 
appropriate, the KVM would intervene with the authorities on behalf of humanitarian 
organizations. The agreement mentions specifically assistance to ICRC in getting access 
to detainees. 
The question remained, however, whether OSCE would be capable of responding in an 
effective way, and whether it had the necessary knowledge, manpower, and material 
resources and capabilities. There was indeed skepticism, since the situation was 
politically very complex.(63) 
At the end of 1998, OSCE was still a rather new organization, and this would be its first 
large mission. The largest to date had been the one to Croatia, with nearly 250 monitors 
on the ground. In Kosovo the ceiling was raised to 2,000 international verifiers,(64) with 
a total of perhaps up to 5,000 local staff. The purely administrative challenge was huge: 
where to find office premises and housing for all the monitors in a region mostly 
destroyed by the armed conflict, as well as quickly get funds for the administration and 
get the equipment needed on the ground to be fully operational. Initially the idea was to 
have an office or team in each municipality, but that was too ambitious. Instead, it was 
envisaged that there would be five regional centers and field offices in 28 municipalities, 
targeting areas where the need for a permanent, deterrent presence would be more 
significant. 
Although within 10 days of signing of OSCE’s agreement with the Yugoslav 
government, the OSCE member states had already pledged around 1,600 persons, it 
appeared that the target of 2,000 verifiers might not be met. Getting the verifiers on the 
ground and training them would take some time. Despite the UN Security Council’s push 
for a rapid deployment of the verifiers, they basically started to arrive only in early 
December 1998 and were expected to reach full strength only by the end of January 
1999.(65) In addition to the slow start, there were concerns that many verifiers would not 
have the necessary background knowledge to be immediately effective upon arrival. 
Although a core group was to be recruited from the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer 
Mission (KDOM) and OSCE missions in Bosnia and Croatia, many would be 
participating in their first OSCE mission. Therefore many would not be familiar with the 
organization or the history of the region concerned, nor would many have worked in a 
conflict prone area. On a positive note, no problems of finding interpreters were 
expected, as there were many Kosovars with language and other skills. The international 
organizations had brought excellent job opportunities to the province. 
The security of OSCE’s staff remained an important concern.(66) Although a core group 
of the verifiers was former military, all verifiers were unarmed. Furthermore, unlike in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, they would not be protected by a military force. The NATO 
airplanes taking part in the Air Verification Mission (AVM) could not provide protection 
on the ground on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, the NATO Extraction Force (XFOR) 
based across the border in Macedonia was far away and had a specific mandate to 
evacuate the verifiers in Kosovo, in case the situation so warranted.(67) Although, 
according to the US Kosovo Diplomatic Observer mission (KDOM), the cease-fire was 
generally holding at the beginning of December 1998,(68) there had been sniping and 
shootings. Therefore it was likely that the verifiers would find themselves in a cross fire, 
threatened or targeted by the warring parties, as happened on several occasions to the US 
KDOM.(69) In order not to be mistaken for Serb police or Serb military, the KDOM and 
OSCE verifiers were driving around in orange colored vehicles. The issue of armed 
bodyguards was raised with Serb authorities, but as expected by some, was rejected by 
the Serbs. Landmines and booby traps were present too, easily hidden in the snow, not 
only making conditions hazardous for staff, but also potentially hindering access to 
returnees and internally displaced persons in more remote areas that are mined.  
The main problem for OSCE at the end of 1998 was to clarify its mandate, and from there 
to work toward a political solution. However, the guidelines were lacking, and the 
questions many. What were the details of the agreement brokered by Mr. Holbrooke with 
regard to the cease-fire? At the end of 1998, there did not seem to be a clear 
understanding of the requirements for the withdrawals of the Serbian Army and Special 
Police Forces, particularly in terms of numbers and locations involved. The KVM is to 
verify the compliance with Security Council resolution 1199, which orders "withdrawal 
of security units used for civilian repression" without any further details in this 
regard.(70) In case of non-compliance, were there any enforcement mechanisms that 
KVM could use? There was clearly confusion about OSCE’s mandate to intervene. The 
UN Secretary General had indicated that the KVM was not mandated to enforce 
compliance, nor to respond to local disturbances and hostilities, nor to enforce access by 
the humanitarian organizations.(71) This interpretation would be bound to frustrate the 
KVM. The Head of the KVM, Mr. William Walker, explained to the media in late 
November 1998, to the dismay of the Serbian authorities, that the KVM would be 
proactive in its efforts to prevent human rights abuses and prepare elections.(72) 
However, whether or not the KVM members were proactive in their role as verifiers, 
there were signs that their mere presence would help internally displaced persons to 
overcome their fears of returning. As earlier mentioned, in areas where KDOM regularly 
had been patrolling, the return rate was 70-100 percent. In that sense, KVM would 
protect the internally displaced from continued displacement. However, being unable to 
enforce compliance with the Security Council resolutions, the KVM would not be able to 
prevent atrocities and renewed displacement, if indeed the parties to the conflict decided 
to renew the full scale armed conflict. Enforcement was entrusted to NATO, which 
remained committed to enforce the compliance of the Security Council Resolution 1199, 
as its threat of bombings remained in force at the end of 1998. On the other hand, a 
question mark remained: that of the threshold for activating such an order.  
The questions related to the political framework were equally many. OSCE is to 
supervise elections in Kosovo, but which were the elections to be arranged? Which were 
the bodies to be elected and what would be their relationship to the Serbian or Yugoslav 
representative bodies? Again, OSCE’s agreement with the Yugoslav government is 
vague, referring only to a mandate of the KVM "to supervise elections in Kosovo to 
ensure their openness and fairness in accordance with regulations and procedures to be 
agreed."(73) Which police force was to be trained: a Serb, an Albanian or a joint police 
force? What were the institutions to be established, on what ethnic basis were they to be 
established, and what would be their competence? All these were extremely important 
questions because a new civic society, with a legitimate government and a functioning 
rule of law that can ensure the respect for human rights, had to be built from scratch.  
With whom should OSCE negotiate? This was another key question, as the Kosovo 
Albanians were divided, and their parallel parliament disputed by the opposition to Mr. 
Ibrahim Rugova, the moderate leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, whose hopes 
to form a government earlier in 1998 had failed.(74) The international community 
representatives, OSCE among them, dealt mainly with Mr. Rugova, rather than with 
those actively involved in the conflict—that is, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
Moreover, the parties were wide apart: the KLA demanded independence, but could 
consider a three year transitional period with the same status of a republic as Montenegro 
and Serbia, while the Yugoslav government would maintain Kosovo as a part of Serbia, 
albeit with a kind of self-rule. Therefore, the shuttle diplomacy of the US Ambassador to 
Macedonia, Mr. Hill, who had been entrusted with trying to find a political settlement 
between the Albanians and the Serbs, had not led to even an interim agreement by the 
end of 1998.(75) 
The large OSCE mission also posed a challenge to UNHCR, which was entrusted with 
the humanitarian response, including facilitating the return of the displaced persons to 
their homes. On the other hand, with the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement OSCE had 
become the lead political organization. It would be necessary for the two organizations to 
work very closely together while still maintaining the fine line between political and 
humanitarian action.(76) Both mandates are crucial for solving the plight of the internally 
displaced persons. 
  
10. Recommendations 
[Editor’s note: These recommendations were written in January 1999, before the collapse 
of the cease fire and the commencement of NATO air strikes in March. The 
recommendations are retained here in their original form to illustrate what options 
appeared viable during the winter of 1998-1999.] 
Protection and assistance to internally displaced persons in Kosovo continued to be a 
challenge to the international community, including UNHCR, at the end of 1998. The real 
challenge was indeed to find a political solution, for which humanitarian action cannot be 
a substitute. On the contrary, humanitarian action, while seemingly alleviating suffering 
of some, does have an impact on the course of the conflict, and could sustain the conflict 
rather than bring it to an end.(77) 
Recommendation No. 1 
Full compliance by all parties to the conflict with the UN Security Council Resolutions 
and restoration of respect for human rights with immediate effect. 
Recommendation No. 2 
A just, fair and sustainable political settlement has to be agreed upon by all parties 
immediately. 
Such a settlement preempts a full compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions, 
1199 and 1203 in particular, including withdrawal of forces and a firm cease-fire with no 
attacks and no provocation, however limited in scope. These are preconditions for 
creating a climate of confidence and trust, during which further negotiations for a final 
political settlement can be held. It is similarly crucial to engage all various parties to the 
conflict on an equal basis in the dialogue and negotiations for compliance, cease-fire, and 
final political settlement. International mediators cannot choose their interlocutors 
according to the outcome the international community would like to see, but have to 
consider the complex situation on the ground with regard to structures of power and 
authority. Nor should the international community attempt to impose a solution of their 
liking, but rather should be attentive to the wishes of the parties concerned, so that the 
mediation facilitates reaching an agreement. The parties themselves have ultimately to 
take the responsibility for confidence building and their settlement. The peace broker 
who imposes a particular solution does not have the necessary backing of the people 
concerned, nor the means to enforce such an agreement if the parties fail to comply. 
Recommendation No. 3 
The right of all people to seek and enjoy asylum has to be respected by all governments. 
The fact that there are efforts to protect and assist internally displaced persons, even 
facilitating their return to their home villages, albeit rarely to their own houses, does not 
mean that there is adequate protection offered by the government concerned, UNHCR, or 
other authorities. As the example of Kosovo has shown, when a cease-fire is extremely 
fragile, neither UNHCR nor other international organizations can prevent violations 
against human rights if the parties to the conflict wish to engage in them.  
Recommendation No. 4 
All agencies involved in the efforts to provide protection and assistance to those affected 
by the conflict in Kosovo (internally displaced persons, returnees, remainees and 
refugees alike) have to be given full support by the international community, including 
funding for projects, both short-term and long-term, staff and equipment. In particular, 
the remaining OSCE verifiers should be sent to Kosovo with immediate effect and given 
full administrative support, training, and clear terms of reference. 
The donor community should respond to the Inter-Agency Appeal for the humanitarian 
response in Kosovo, as well as other appeals, so that the activities so far undertaken can 
be carried forward and new ones commence. The needs for assistance and protection 
continue to be enormous. Resources are also needed for training and coordination of 
activities to enhance the protection and assistance capacity of all agencies involved. The 
UNHCHR should be allocated the staff and equipment it needs to be fully operational. 
Furthermore, additional political support is needed from the international community to 
support the ICTY in its request for visas for its staff to travel to Kosovo to investigate the 
alleged atrocities. It is of utmost importance for confidence-building, as a basis for 
successful negotiations for a political settlement, that those who allegedly have 
committed crimes against humanity and other atrocities be investigated, charged, and 
punished as appropriate. 
Recommendation No. 5 
The agencies in Kosovo should continue their monitoring, reporting, and advocacy work 
on the human rights and humanitarian situation, and develop joint reporting mechanisms 
and strategies, giving due consideration to the mandate of each organization. 
All agencies, whether relief, development, humanitarian, or human rights organizations, 
have key information for those agencies whose mandate is specifically linked to human 
rights. Human rights organizations should be included in the coordination network of the 
agencies involved in the humanitarian response. It is important that all information is 
gathered systematically and in a coordinated manner, in order to support the efforts to 
enhance the overall human rights situation. This also requires that the international 
verifiers, monitors and relief workers, to the extent possible, are familiar with human 
rights and human rights monitoring, and will be adequately trained upon arrival. 
UNHCR, for its part, should have a sufficient number of staff members with a 
background in protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, in place in 
Kosovo. Considering a final political settlement, respect for human rights and 
international humanitarian law has been used as a measure of legitimacy of the parties 
concerned in many conflict situations. 
Recommendation No. 6 
Capacity building of local structures should be an integral part of all activities. 
An emergency situation disrupts all local structures and networks. It is important to 
incorporate capacity building early on as part of all activities. In a complex political 
situation, such as the one in Kosovo, all agencies should coordinate together carefully. 
The political settlement will define some of the institutions, but a lot can already be done 
with regard to existing local humanitarian and human rights organizations, social and 
professional networks, police, judiciary, administration, and so forth. 
Recommendation No. 7 
Coordination between all agencies as well as between agencies and the authorities of all 
sides should be enhanced. 
Coordination is key to any operation in a complex emergency situation. The two lead 
agencies, UNHCR for the humanitarian response and OSCE for verification of 
compliance and other political issues, have to coordinate closely. The establishment of 
Liaison Officers and training are already enhancing the cooperation between the two, but 
it is equally important to establish new functional coordination structures among all 
agencies, considering the new situation with two lead agencies. On the other hand, as the 
mandates of the two lead agencies are different, albeit complimentary, it would be 
necessary to raise awareness of these differences among both other organizations and the 
public. Equally crucial is cooperation among all agencies as well as among the agencies 
and the authorities on all sides. 
  
11. Conclusions 
The case of Kosovo during 1998 illustrates that protection of internally displaced persons 
can take many forms and involve many actors, even when the government concerned is 
unable or unwilling to take responsibility. In Kosovo during this period, UNHCR set out 
to coordinate the protection and assistance activities, and with increased material and 
human resources the agency’s protection capacity started to increase even before the 
Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. It is evident that UNHCR’s presence (and that of other 
international organizations), reporting, humanitarian convoys, and other activities 
provided a limited degree of protection for the internally displaced persons. It is equally 
important to note that protection can be successful only when the teamwork within and 
between all organizations is functioning, when resources are forthcoming, and when there 
is consent and cooperation from the various authorities on all sides. Moreover, protection 
and assistance to internally displaced persons should be a part of an overall strategy, 
which includes security, human rights, and most importantly, a political solution. 
Foremost, humanitarian action cannot substitute for a political solution, and continued 
physical security can be guaranteed only once there is a fair and just political settlement. 
The international organizations do not have the means to prevent atrocities if the parties 
to the conflict decide to embark on such a path. Nor can the humanitarian organizations, 
UNHCR among them, be blamed for not dealing with the root causes of the conflict, 
since that would be an overestimation of their mandates, as well as of their potential to 
address political issues.  
The cease-fire agreement reached in October 1998 did not in itself provide for a 
settlement or lasting peace, nor did the presence of the KVM, UNHCR, or other 
international organizations do so. At the end of 1998 there were estimates among US 
diplomats that there would be only a one to two month "window of opportunity" during 
which to achieve a political settlement that could both satisfy the Albanian majority and 
protect the Serb and other minorities. Regrettably, such a settlement was not achieved. 
The key lesson from the Great Lakes operation in 1996 is the following:  
Continued international failure to tackle the political and security 
dimensions of the crisis, combined with sustained use of humanitarian 
assistance in the resultant policy vacuum, undermines the credibility, 
reputation, and long-term viability of humanitarian action, to deleterious 
consequence for the lives and livelihoods of those whom humanitarian 
action is supposed to protect and assist.(78)  
The key lesson from Kosovo remains to be drawn.  
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